CrisisConnect
Six hundred messages, one brief worth signing.
When a cyclone makes landfall, the signals arrive in four languages on seven channels at once — most unverified, some dangerous. CrisisConnect is designed to listen to every channel, triangulate every claim, ask five sibling agents what they can see, and hand a named human a draft worth signing. It never decides. Today it structures reports you paste in and drafts a sitrep outline; it ingests no feeds and allocates nothing.
- Channels (designed)
- Web todayPlanned: WhatsApp · SMS · Voice · API
- Languages (designed)
- English · French · Arabic · Swahili · Spanish · Portuguese
- Designed for
- Global
- Tools
- 11 declared11 illustrative
Before the nine o’clock brief
An illustrative scenario, the one the agent’s system prompt is written around: Cox’s Bazar, the morning after a Category-4 cyclone. By 09:00 a coordinator must brief the Humanitarian Country Team: what is verified, which camps have lost water, which clinics are reachable, where tomorrow’s food gap will open. The signals come in Bengali, Rohingya, Burmese and English, on WhatsApp, SMS, Ushahidi crowd-maps, ReliefWeb and the IFRC GO feed. Read by hand: six hundred messages, a brief six hours late. The design aims to bring that down to minutes. Nothing has been measured, and none of those feeds is connected yet.
Seventy-two hours, line by line
That brief is one frame of a longer discipline. Here is the rest of the film, condensed: a specimen operations log in the shape of the scripted ‘72 Hours in Turkana’ exercise the Hub’s orchestration is patterned on. It shows the design, and nothing in it has happened. Ingestion is designed to strip phone numbers, emails and coordinates; names are not removed, and the message itself is recorded by the platform. Five sibling agents answer the fan-out under their own colours, and every outbound line must show the two-source gate — ✓✓ — before it is allowed to fire. Watch the schoolhouse shelter: first heard at hour six, held as a single source, and broadcast only when a second, independent source stands it up a day later.
Timestamps run hours : minutes from the flood’s onset. Entries surface as you read down the page. The complete log is on the page for assistive technology at all times, whatever the scroll position.
- 00:07ingest
Intake open across SMS, WhatsApp, Ushahidi and the radio log — 142 raw reports. Phone numbers, emails and coordinates stripped and reporter handles hashed at intake.
- 00:19verify
Bridge out at the river crossing: county civil-protection bulletin (tier 1), corroborated by an IFRC GO field report (tier 2). Verdict — verified.
- 00:24broadcast
Route advisory drafted as a CAP message, scope Restricted. Named signer: the county duty officer. Two-source gate passed: Sent.
- 01:40AquaGuard
Fan-out reply — three boreholes flooded; a turbidity spike on the river intake, checked against the latest satellite pass.
- 02:12HealthChain · Epidemic
Fan-out reply — watery-diarrhoea signals at two clinics, logged in syndromic language only. Naming a pathogen is the WHO custodian’s call.
- 06:48broadcast
Shelter reportedly open at the schoolhouse: one tier-3 community post, no second source. Filed under information gaps for recheck. One source of the two required: single source — NOT broadcast.
- 09:00sitrep
5W sitrep no. 1 drafted — verified facts and information gaps kept apart, an expiry stamped on every line. Routed to a named human for signature.
- 14:30FoodRescue
Fan-out reply — two distribution points cut off; a thirty-six-hour food gap opens in the eastern settlements unless trucking is rerouted.
- 20:05GridOptimizer
Fan-out reply — the clinic microgrid has islanded safely; about eleven hours of battery autonomy at current load.
- 26:42match
Proposal — reroute WASH trucking to boreholes two and five. A proposal only, surfaced to the WASH cluster lead; a human approved it at 27:15.
- 31:08verify
The schoolhouse shelter again — an IFRC assessment team now on site (tier 2) and the county officer confirming (tier 1). Verdict — verified.
- 31:20broadcast
Shelter advisory, named signer on record — a day after first heard, and never on one source. Two-source gate passed: Sent.
- 48:00expiry
Scheduled sweep — seventeen records past their expires_at drop out of sitrep no. 3 until refreshed. Crisis information is perishable.
- 71:45SkillBridge
Fan-out reply — movement toward two host villages; protection-mainstreaming flags applied to the displacement picture.
- 72:00sitrep
Handover brief drafted at confidence 0.86. Two claims sit below the 0.80 floor — escalated to humans, not bluffed.
A specimen of the design, not a transcript: the place, the timings and every entry are illustrative, and nothing in it has happened. Today CrisisConnect ingests no feeds, reads no sibling agent’s live data and sends nothing. The discipline it shows is from the information-verification-protocol and sitrep-5w-template skills — a broadcast needs a tier-1 source or two independent tier-2 sources and a named human signer, matches are proposals to IASC cluster leads, and every record expires. Ingestion is designed to strip phone numbers, emails and coordinates; names are not removed.
Four verdicts and a ladder of trust
Before a claim can reach a sitrep, an alert or a sibling agent, it faces the four tests of the information-verification-protocol skill: source credibility, independent corroboration, temporal plausibility, geographic plausibility. The vocabulary that comes back — the one running through the log above — is small and unforgiving.
- Verified
- All four tests pass, with a tier-1 source or two independent tier-2 sources. Only these facts make headline numbers.
- Pending
- The default for every new claim; it lives in a sitrep’s information-gaps section, never in a broadcast.
- Disputed
- Credible sources contradict each other. Never propagated — tracked, and answered through a trusted community messenger per IFRC rumour-management discipline.
- False
- Evidence contradicts the claim. Logged and contained, never ignored — silence reads as confirmation.
- Source tier
- Structural credibility, from tier 1 (a civil-protection authority) to tier 5 (a forwarded screenshot, weight nil). A thousand tier-5 posts cannot make a fact.
The grammar of a response
Its yardsticks are the sector’s own, cited by name so that anyone can audit the reasoning. Gaps are stated against the sphere-minimum-standards skill — fifteen litres of water per person per day, one toilet per twenty people — never “water is short”. Matches are drafted for the accountable lead among the eleven IASC clusters per iasc-cluster-system, and nothing is sent to them; every action maps to a phase of the ocha-humanitarian-programme-cycle. Sitreps follow the sitrep-5w-template’s seven sections with audience-specific redaction, alert drafts are Common Alerting Protocol payloads per cap-alerting-protocol, and structured rows carry hxl-humanitarian-exchange-language tags so that other organisations’ pipelines could read them without bespoke parsing.
The never list
The refusals are enforced in code where we can; the rest are instructions to the model.
- Never broadcast an unverified rescue location. Even verified ones stay private by default; a wrong rescue point can be fatal.
- Never put PII in a sitrep. Designed to strip phone numbers, emails and coordinates from drafts. Names are not removed, and the message itself is recorded by the platform.
- Never disclose a community reporter’s identity without fresh, explicit consent — in GBV and protection contexts, never at all.
- Never allocate resources. Matches are proposals; in the planned deployment, a named IASC cluster lead approves every one. Today nothing is allocated.
- Never issue a public alert as “Actual” without a named human signer; never name a pathogen in a public sitrep.
- Never serve a record past its expiry, and never bluff — below 0.80 confidence the agent says it is unsure; in the planned deployment, a named human is asked to look.
“Trust is structural, not personal. Echo-chamber amplification is not corroboration.”
Designed around the humanitarian commons
No affiliation or endorsement. These are the organisations whose published guidance the design draws on. No partner system is connected.
The design looks to infrastructure the sector already runs: OCHA’s ReliefWeb and HDX, the IFRC GO platform, Ushahidi’s community crowd-maps, CLEAR Global’s language-in-crisis glossaries. None of it is connected yet: today CrisisConnect only structures reports you paste in. In the first hours of a sudden-onset event some of those sources would be unreachable, and the design degrades honestly — “OCHA ReliefWeb unreachable; using last-known cached situation pack” — lowering its confidence, and never fabricating a record, a P-code or a cluster activation to fill the gap.